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Yemeni ‘Oceanic Policy’ at the end of the 13th Century 
 
Eric Vallet 
 
In 1278, Yemeni troops conquered the city of øafār (Fig. 1). They were sent by 
the Rasūlid sultan al-Muúaffar, son of the founder of the Rasūlid dynasty which 
dominated South-West Arabia until the middle of the fifteenth century.(1) The 
Rasūlid court historian al-¿azrajī describes the victory: “And when the sultan, 
may God have mercy on him, conquered the city of øafār (…) and Sālim son of 
Idrīs [its previous ruler] was killed, the whole of the qa×iyya countries [= distant 
countries] trembled through awe of the sultan, while the hearts of the Princes of 
Persia, as of the Lords of India and China, were filled with fear of him, from 
what they witnessed of his soaring ambition and his great power of retaliation.” 
(al-¿azrajī 1906, i: 198) This event certainly represents the peak of Rasūlid 
power, even if al-¿azrajī, who is writing more than hundred years after al-
Muúaffar’s reign, no doubt exaggerated the implications of this annexation.(2) 
However, we should note that while al-¿azrajī includes the far China’s Mongol 
Khān among the rulers he mentions, he seems to forget one of the most powerful 
sultanates of that time: the Mamluk sultanate, which was very close by, and a 
permanent rival of Rasūlid Yemen. Indeed, with the conquest of øafār, the 
Rasūlid sultan competed not with the Mamluks but with the rulers of Oman, 
Persia or India, all active in some way in the Indian Ocean area. ¿azrajī’s report, 
while it does not reveal the exact balance of power, underlines al-Muúaffar’s real 
ambition to assert his Sultanate as a great power in the Indian Ocean. 
 
My aim in this contribution is not to describe Yemeni foreign policy in this area. 
I will focus instead on the manner in which the Rasūlid sultanate used this 
common space that was ocean at the end of the 13th century. I propose that 
Rasūlids did not have an indifferent or passive attitude in this matter. Rather, 
they strove to organise uses and practices; in short, to develop an ‘oceanic 
policy’. 
 
Why the end of the 13th century ? 
A new Yemeni source, which is a set of scattered documents related to the 
Rasūlid administration, has been recently edited by Mu½ammad Jāzim, 
researcher at the French Centre for Archaeology and Social Sciences in Sanaa 
(Jāzim 2003). These administrative and fiscal reports were written between 1290 
and 1294, most probably for al-Muúaffar himself, and were likely to have been 
bound in a single volume after his death in 1295. This collection, which the 
editor calls Nūr al-ma‘ārif fī nuúūm wa-qawā‘id wa-a‘rāf al-Yaman fī al-‘ahd al-
muúaffarī al-wārif (‘the Light of Knowledge on Regulations, Rules and Customs 
of al-Muúaffar’s Glorious Time’) contains a wide range of documents on 
maritime trade, especially on Aden taxes (2003: 409-491) and rules of the port 
(2003: 492-514) . This source is of great importance, as one of the rare examples 
known to us of state archives from the medieval Islamic period. On the other 
hand, Nūr al-ma‘ārif, as a source containing very singular material, presents a lot 
of difficulties in terms of its interpretation and I do not pretend to offer a 
definitive version here.(3) 
 
The second reason for my chronological choice is linked with the political 
context at the end of the 13th century. In 1290, three great powers exerted their 
hegemony around the Ocean or its neighbouring seas: Mamlūks in Egypt and 
Syria, Mongol IlÀāns in Persia and the Turkish Delhi Sultanate established in 
North India by Qußb al-Dīn Aybāk in 1206 after Shihāb al-Dīn al-Ghūrī’s 
conquests. As we shall see, all these states had only a limited access to the sea. In 
the West, Rasūlids controlled in large part the navigation in the Red Sea and 
maintained their influence on Mecca, competing with the Egyptian rulers since 
629/1232.(4) In the Gulf, coasts were directly or indirectly dominated by the 
island of Qays, itself part of the Mongol IlÀānate since 1224 and ruled by the 
powerful family al-Þībī. The more eastern province of Kirmān and its seaport 
Hurmuz benefited from a certain autonomy which did not question Qays’ 
hegemony.(5) 
 
As for India, the majority of its ports were outside the Delhi Sultanate’s authority 
and their control was shared between different Hindu states, often in competition 
with one another. In South India, the Pāndyas had overcome during the 13th 
century the once powerful Cholas and extended their influence over 
Coromandel’s land and coast, even at some points as far as Ceylan.(6) Separated 
from the Coromandel by the Ghatts mountains, Malabar’s numerous seaports 
maintained their autonomy under several local dynasties (Bouchon 1976: 27-31). 
Northward, the Pāndyas were opposed to Hoysalas, a dynasty based inland but 
which was linked to the ports of Fākanūr and Manjalūr (Mangalore) (Majumdar 
1957: 230-232). The Konkani coast and its main port of Tāna fell under the 
Yadavas’ rule, a dynasty which was sometimes at war with the Hoysalas 
(Majumdar 1957: 193, 230-231). Gujarat was also rich with numerous ports, the 
main being Cambay and Broach, dominated from the north by the Vaghelas, who 
had to face to the Delhi Sultanate’s threats (Majumdar 1957: 81). This politically 
scattered situation, together with the geographical conditions, promoted without 
any doubt the multiplication of ports on the Indian western coast. 
 
This configuration was not to last until the beginning of the new century. Under 
‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khaljī’s reign (695-715/1296-1316) the Delhi Sultanate saw a huge 
expansion which unified a great part of India under a Turkish Muslim authority, 
beginning with the rich kingdom of Gujarat in 698/1299 and followed by 
Deccan. In 1335, the independent Hindu States were reduced to a very short 
territory in the extreme south of India and on the Malabar coast. 
 
In the Gulf area, Qays’ hegemony was challenged by Hurmuz, established since 
1300 on the island of Jārūn. This fierce competition ended after 1320 by the 
defeat of Qays and the appearance of a new Hurmuzī political order (Aubin 
1953: 99-106). The last decade of the thirteenth century is then an interesting 
period in the Indian Ocean area: it represents the last stage of a geopolitical 
configuration which emerged in the first third of the thirteenth century, but 
which would not survive the transformations of the beginning of the 14th century. 
 
Maritime networks in the Indian Ocean 
Any inquiry should first of all consider the differences between the maritime 
spaces in this area. The Red Sea and the Gulf have the very distinctive features 
of a sea that is almost entirely isolated, but intensely used. However, I will not 
study these differences in detail in this article.(7) As far as the Ocean is 
concerned, the sources at our disposal from the Yemeni point of view focus 
essentially on the contacts between Yemen and India. This does not mean that 
the Rasūlids did not deal with the African coast or the Omani coast, while 
archaeological finds attest it. But India seems to have been the main object of 
Yemeni Oceanic Policy. 
 
Maritime itineraries in the Ocean are rather well-known thanks to the nautical 
guides of the end of the 15th century (Tibbetts 1971). Due to seasonal variations 
of the wind, the navigation followed a very precise calendar which differed from 
one region to another. This calendar was studied for Aden in several almanachs 
published and translated by R.B. Serjeant (1974: 216-217) and D.M. Varisco 
(1994 a & b). In the Indian Ocean proper, several seasons are mentioned. For 
Qaysī ships, the arrival in Aden had to be before the middle of November and 
the departure not until the end of May. As for Indian ships (al-Hindī), the season 
was in Aden between April and August. We should here pay special attention to 
both terms ‘Qaysī ships’ and ‘Indian ships’. In the first case, vessels seem to 
come from one single port – this concentration was a result of Qays hegemony. 
In the second, there is no precision, unless we take into account a distinction 
between al-Hindī and al-Ñūliyān, one of the names used for Coromandel. If we 
do, then the ‘Indian ships’ must have come from the whole western coast of 
India - from Malabar in the south to Gujarat in the north. But, however inclusive 
this term may be, it should not lead us to conclude that all the Indian ports had 
the same function in the Oceanic network. 
 
India’s Trade 
As for trade in precious goods, not all the regions of India played the same role – 
this is also well-known (Digby 1982; Jain 1988). To sum up this briefly, we 
could distinguish four different regions with which Aden was commercially 
linked: 
1. Coromandel, which served as an intermediary between China and South-East 
Asia for aromatics, chinaware and some precious textiles; 
2. Malabar, with its own production of spices (pepper, cardamom, etc.); 
3. Konkan, important for some strategic materials like wood and iron; 
4. Gujarāt, and its abundant cotton fabrics. 
All these regions also furnished various food products, principally rice, and 
textiles. These last products may represent the greatest part of the freight to 
Arabia. 
 
Of course, trade was not only from India to Yemen. If we now consider Yemeni 
exports to India, several important distinctions should be made. 
For example, one of the most important exports from Aden was madder (fuwwa), 
a dyeing material used to create the colour red, the cultivation of which was 
largely spread in the South Yemeni mountains (Varisco 1994b: 157; Sa‘īd 1998: 
308). The few hints contained in Nūr al-ma‘ārif (2003: 178-181, 499) show that 
this export may have been of great volume. Following Ibn al-Mujāwir (1951: 
144), it was a major source of fiscal profit. The majority of it was certainly 
directed to the north Indian coast, Gujarat and Konkan, for the uses of their 
abundant textile production.(8) 
 
Nevertheless, the commodity which attracted the greatest attention and interest, 
and provided also certainly the greatest profit was Arabian horses. They were not 
only a prestigious commodity in India, but moreover the key to military success 
(Digby 1971 & 1982: 148; Chakravarti 1992). The strength of the Delhi 
Sultanate was mainly based on his cavalry, but horses were brought to Delhi 
essentially by the northern landroutes. Only a small number of Yemeni horses 
were carried there. Actually, horse exports from Aden were massively directed to 
the Hindu States of the western and eastern coast. 
 
In addition to Marco Polo and the Persian Historian Va××āf testimonies,(9) the 
Nūr al-ma‘ārif collection (2003: 189) shows that Pāndyas’ Kingdom of 
Coromandel was an avid purchaser of Arabian horses – certainly the most 
important in the Peninsula, due to its numerous campaigns against its neighbours 
and frequent internal dissensions. But Nūr al-ma‘ārif (2003: 265) testifies that 
the Yemeni horses were also sold in Malabar, particularly in both Fākanūr and 
Manjalūr seaports linked with the Hoysalas’ State, which was regularly opposed 
to its neighbours Pāndyas. On the other hand, we have no precise information 
about supplies to Tāna or to Gujarāt. The only evidence in this respect known to 
me is from Marco Polo (1875: 385 & Digby 1991). The Venitian traveler reports 
indeed that Tāna’s ruler was reduced to use the services of some pirates in order 
to renew his cavalry. This confirms the limitation of horse trade in this region. 
However, what is important to note here is a certain complementarity in the 
Yemeni main exports: madder in the north; horses in the south, even though we 
have no sufficient information on the volume and the benefits of these exports. 
 
Horse trade was of course of political importance. It was a source of tension 
between the Delhi Sultanate and horse traders who dealt with the South Indian 
States, their enemies. Delhi Sultans pretended even to forbid to these traders to 
conduct business inside of their territory (Chakravarti 1991: 180). Moreover, this 
must have had an impact on the relationships between Rasūlid Yemen and Delhi, 
but we have no information about this.  
 
That said, in the south Pāndyas Kingdom of Coromandel, Yemeni horses were 
not the sole Arabian horses to be exported. They had to reckon with the Qaysī, 
Hurmuzī, Qalhātī, Ba½raynī horses. This trade – conducted by the Þībī’s family 
which sent several thousands of horses each year, is well-known: it relied in the 
Kingdom of Coromandel especially on Taqī al-Dīn al-Þībī, brother of Qays’ 
ruler Jamāl al-Dīn al-Þībī and vizier of the Pāndyas king (Aubin 1953: 94; Digby 
1982: 148). One could ask how the Rasūlids managed to cope with Þībī’s 
supremacy in Coromandel? Was there any sort of competition? We can perhaps 
find the beginnings of an answer if we consider who the Indian rulers honoured 
with precious presents by the Rasūlid Sultanate were. By chance, Nūr al-ma‘ārif 
has preserved such a list for 1293 and 1294. On it, we read without surprise the 
names of the Indian princes of Fākanūr and Manjalūr, the Þībī vizier of the 
Pāndyas Kingdom at the first rank, as well as his messenger sent from 
Coromandel to Aden.(10) We can therefore assume that the extension of Þībī’s 
network in eastern India was not an obstacle for Yemeni trade, which was 
integrated into this network. 
 
The Rasūlid naval policy 
How did this political and commercial integration happen? The question of 
maritime transport was crucial at the time. If such a large network existed, from 
Yemen to Coromandel and Qays, those who maintained contact between its 
different heads or places – which is to say the shipowners - may have been 
hugely powerful. 
 
The Rasūlid Sultan and his Administration (dīwān) owned ships. We find some 
testimonies of this in the Nūr al-ma‘ārif book, especially as far as the Red Sea is 
concerned. Yemeni Administration had a fleet carrying goods and men between 
Aden and the Egyptian port of ‘Aydhāb. Aden’s rules, preserved by Nūr al-
ma‘ārif, are particularly clear on this point: no ship coming from India can have 
gone on to the Red Sea. All the commodities had to be unloaded in Aden, and 
reloaded on new boats sailing to Egypt, ships of the Rasūlid Diwan (marākib al-
dīwān) taking priority for this (Nūr al-ma‘ārif 2003: 492-494). Nevertheless, we 
do not hear about these marākib al-dīwān in the Indian Ocean area. We know 
only that galleys were used for military purposes and not to carry commodities or 
passengers. These galleys, called shawānī in Arabic, were used for example for 
the conquest of Zafār (Ibn ¼ātim 1974 i: 511; al-¿azrajī 1913 iv: 211). 
Moreover, a tax called shawānī was collected by Aden’s customs.(11) It was 
supposed to pay for the protection - provided by the galleys - of trade ships 
coming from the Gulf or from India, as piracy was a constant danger around the 
Ocean. A document recorded in Nūr al-ma‘ārif mentions that the crew of these 
galleys (ºilmān al-shawānī) was composed of crossbow bearers (karrāÀiyyīn), 
rowers, soldiers (ajnād) and sailors (2003: 176). Another document indicates that 
the Rasūlid dīwān had to pay a 3 month-salary to each soldier going to 
Coromandel or to India (2003: 175). That does not mean of course that they did 
this journey regularly – but it indicates that they did it sometimes at least, 
certainly as protectors of some conveys of ships. 
 
If not the Yemeni galley, which was limited to a military role, then what was 
carrying goods from and to Aden? Following Nūr al-ma‘ārif (2003: 500, 504, 
505), horses and madder were bought in Aden by the nawāÀiä (singular form 
nāÀūäa) of India, a well-known term which means both shipowners and ship 
captains (Chakravarti 2000 & 2002). Thus we conclude, shipowners were also 
merchants. They were even important merchants, engaged in big trade - in 
horses, or madder. Nūr al-ma‘ārif preserved the names of some of these 
merchants-shipowners, often organized in families, whether or not they favoured 
a particular maritime route.(12) All the names are apparently related to Muslims. 
This does not imply the absence of Hindu nāÀūäa, who may have been also 
honoured. We know from other sources that several Hindu rulers or kings 
possessed ships, such as the King of Sri Lanka (under Pāndyas’ domination) who 
claimed in 1283 to own 26 ships (al-Maqrīzī 1939: i, 713), or the Hindu ruler of 
Jurfattān in Malabar following Ibn Baßßūßa’s later testimony (Ibn Baßßūßa 1879 
iv: 83). But these Hindu rulers may have been represented on their ships by 
Muslim as well as Hindu merchants. 
 
At the time, the role of the Yemeni State in the transoceanic network between 
Aden and India seems to be quite clear: the ships were owned and managed 
principally by big Muslim merchants, and appear to have been protected 
sometimes by Yemeni galleys. 
 
Yemeni oceanic policy and the islamization of the Indian Ocean area 
Was this Yemeni maritime activity only meant to ensure the safety of trade? Or 
did it aim at more political objectives? In India at that time there were numerous 
Muslim communities, and Yemeni power was not indifferent to them. This is 
what we learn from the last document of the Nūr al-ma‘ārif, written in 1293 
(2003: 516-518). It contains several lists of annual grants sent to Muslim judges 
and preachers in India, distributed across 6 territories: North & South 
Gujarat,(13) North & South Konkan,(14) Malabar and al-Ñūliyyān/Coromandel. 
For each region the number of people awarded grants is given, as well as the 
name of the city or area in which they live (Fig 2). 
 
Region Number of cities quoted Number of judges and 
preachers awarded grants
North Gujarat 12 12 
South Gujarat 9 9 
North Konkan 7 9 
South Konkan Unknown 9 
Malabar 8 20 
Coromandel 5 5 
Fig. 2 Repartition of the grants sent to India by the Rasūlid administration 
 
To analyse these lists is difficult - reading the names of Indian cities, and their 
locations, in Arabic presents particular problems. Nevertheless, some interesting 
conclusions can be drawn. First, a huge concentration of these communities on 
the coast is apparent, which can be related of course to trading activities. That 
said, the Yemeni influence was not limited to the coast, but penetrated deep into 
inland areas - particularly in Gujarat North and South, as far as the city of 
Anahilwāda, capital of the Vaghelas Kingdom (Majumdar 1957: 81). Finally, the 
striking fact is that this repartition overlaps directly with the political limits, 
since in 1293 Gujarat had not yet been annexed by the Delhi Sultanate: all the 
communities supported by the Rasūlid administration were outside of Delhi 
Sultanate’s sovereignty. We must then conclude that these grants to Muslim 
religious leaders had a significant political dimension. This could be related to 
the known opposition between the two Muslim Indias: the one Turkish hanafi, 
where Islam entered by the northern land routes; the other Arab Shāfi‘ī, where 
Islam entered by the maritime southern ways (Gaborieau 1995: 431-434; Vallet 
2005: 153-154). In the context of dramatic military opposition between the 
Turkish Delhi Sultanate and the Hindu States, it was indeed crucial for the 
Muslim communities living in these Hindu States that they were not assimilated 
to the northern Turkish enemy. 
 
In return, this Yemeni support of the Indian Muslim communities benefited 
Rasūlid interests. For the Rasūlid sultan al-Muúaffar, it was a source of 
legitimization, acting as a power protecting and defending Islam. Al-Muúaffar no 
doubt enjoyed this reputation in the whole area. Marco Polo, who did not visit 
the South Arabian coast, but heard about it, testifies to this. In his account, al-
Muúaffar appears as a true enemy for Christians, may they be in Abyssinia or in 
Palestine. He reports that in 1291, al-Muúaffar sent troops to the Mamlūk Sultan, 
contributing to the fall of Acre, the last place of the Crusader States in Palestine 
(Marco Polo 1875: 434-435). Let us also remember that the Rasūlid Sultan 
interfered with the affairs of the Muslim communities in India when the Chinese 
King had forbidden the circumcision of Muslim children in his kingdom (al-
¿azrajī 1913 iv: 279). 
 
Thus this religious and political dimension should be taken into account when 
considering with transoceanic navigation. From India, Aden was on the main 
route to Mecca. That Yemeni galleys made the oceanic circulation regular and 
secure was essential for these distant communities, who could stay in contact 
with central regions of Islam. 
 
Conclusion 
From the textual evidence referred to in this study, it is clear that the Rasūlid 
power had a real oceanic policy at the end of the 13th century. This policy served 
not only trade but also other political or religious objectives. It relied on a 
controlled network of navigation, whose main actors were Muslim merchants-
shipowners, supported by Muslim (Rasūlid in Yemen and Þībī in Qays) and 
Hindu powers. This implies at least good cooperation, and perhaps even an 
alliance between both Rasūlid and Þībī power at that time, a collaboration which 
could explain why it was so important for the Rasūlids to control øafār, mid-way 
between Qays and Yemen.(15) The question remains when this system was 
constituted and how did survived or adapted to the drastic geopolitical changes 
in the first middle of the 14th century. However, from a methodological point of 
view, the situation described above, which is related to such a specific context, 
could not be extended to the previous or the following periods without a 
thorough examination of the changing political, economical and religious 
context, even if historical sources do not offer such clear evidence as Nūr al-
ma‘ārif does for the end of the 13th century. Nevertheless, it is only by doing 
more similarly detailed studies that we will be in a position to assess whether or 
not this maritime policy was a distinctive feature of the whole Rasūlid dynasty. 
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Endnotes 
(1) For a general account on Rasūlids, see Smith 1994 and ‘Abd al-‘¤l 1980 (in 
Arabic). On al-Muúaffar: Varisco 1994a. 
(2) A detailed study of the conquest of øafār is given in Smith & Porter 1988. 
On al-¿azrajī’s court historiography, see Smith 1969. 
(3) My dissertation will offer an annotated translation in French of parts of the 
book concerned with the maritime trade. 
(4) On this competition, ‘Abd al-‘Âl 1980: 333-400 (in Arabic) ; Garcin 1976: 
202-204. 
(5) On Qays and Hurmuz at the end of the 13th Century, see Aubin 1953: 89-99. 
(6) For a general presentation of the Indian coast history, see Wink 1997: 265-
293. On Pāndyas’ dynastic history, Majumdar 1957: 256-260. 
(7) On the Gulf maritime networks, see Aubin 1973 and Piacentini Fiorani 2000. 
These contributions focus on the 15th century but offer interesting insights into 
the previous period. As for the Red Sea, Lunde & Porter 2004. 
(8) « If madder (fuwwa) is carried to Tāna or Gujarāt or anywhere, the export 
tithe is due. » (Nūr al-ma‘ārif 2003: 496) 
(9) Marco Polo 1875: 364. Va××āf, a Persian Historian of the first middle of the 
14th c., is quoted in Digby 1982: 148. 
(10) For ‘Abd al-Ra½mān al-Þībī, see Nūr al-ma‘ārif: 515 & 519 ; his 
messenger: 519. Honours to the chiefs (ru’asā’) of the Muslim community in 
Fayākanūn (read Fākanūr), Mu½ammad and his nephew ‘Alī, are mentioned p. 
515. But the Hindu rulers (sā½ib) of Fākanūr and Manjalūr are also recorded p. 
518. Note that unlike Muslim characters, their proper names are not quoted. 
(11) This tax is first mentioned by Ibn al-Mujāwir (1951: 141-142). The fiscal 
lists of Nūr al-ma‘ārif record it also, especially pp. 409-460 and 461-477. A 
study of this tax was proposed by R.B. Serjeant (1974: 218) and G.R. Smith 
(1995: 131). 
(12) Nūr al-ma‘ārif, 2003: 515-516, 519: Bilāl al-Tānishī in Malabar; 
Mu½ammad al-Salāmī and Burhān al-Dīn al-Salamī in Coromandel; Yūsuf al-
¼alawī, ‘Uthmān b. Bakkāsh and his sons are not related to a precise place. All 
of them are qualified as nāÀūdha. Note that Ibn Bakkāsh is also recorded in 
Ta’rīÀ Thaºr ‘Adan (Bā MaÀrama, 1936-1950: ii, 26) as a great merchant in 
Aden who lived until the end of his life in an Indian port. 
(13) North Gujarāt (bilād al-Juzarāt) is presented here as the territory of al-Qa××, 
related to the Kutch region. South Gujarāt (bilād al-Juz) is the territory of 
Kambāya (Cambay). 
(14) North Konkan is called bilād al-Bulºā, an old name which is already 
recorded by al-Mas‘ūdī (1966: 97) and derived from the Ballahara, a dynasty 
which ruled between 743 et 974 on this region. What is called bilād al-Kumkam 
in the list seems to be rather South Konkan: it is presented as the territory of 
Lamībasūr (an unknown place which I suspect to be actually Sindābūr). 
(15) Note in this regard that the origin of øafār’s conquest was the capture by 
Sālim b. Idrīs, ruler of øafār, of the ambassadors sent by al-Muúaffar to the IlÀān 
of Persia (Ibn ¼ātim i: 506 ; al-¿azrajī 1913 iv: 208). 
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